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AN UNHURRIED LOOK
AT OBSCENITY
JOHN

A

DECADE HAS PASSED

J.

REGAN, C.M. *

since the Supreme Court handed down its

first major decision on obscenity. Scarcely a year has gone by in
that period without at least one significant decision, and each has
caused in varying degrees outbursts of criticism of the Court. The
decisions have appeared against the background of the so-called
"sexual revolution" in the country. They are likewise part of an era
of expanding individual liberties guaranteed by the Court.
This article will attempt to summarize the evolution in the Supreme Court's handling of obscenity over the past decade and its
significance as seen by some of the major commentators.

I. The Roth-Alberts Cases
For all practical purposes the decade began on June 24, 1957, with
the decision in the Roth-Alberts cases.' Earlier in 1957 the Court
had held that a Michigan obscenity statute violated the first and
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution because it prohibited the
sale to an adult of a book unsuitable for minors2 but the Court
left for the Roth decision a full exposition of the constitutional aspects of obscenity legislation.
The Roth decision contains in embryo practically all of the major
issues which would emerge in subsequent cases through the decade,
and therefore a somewhat detailed exposition of the decision is
desirable.

* B.A., Mary Immaculate College; M.A., St. John's University; LL.B., Columbia University; Member of the New York Bar.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
2Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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Samuel Roth had been convicted in a
jury trial for violating the federal criminal obscenity statute 3 on charges of mailing obscene circulars and advertising, and
an obscene book. David Alberts had been
convicted under a complaint that he
lewdly kept for sale obscene and indecent
books, and for writing, composing and
publishing an obscene advertisement of
them, in violation of the California Penal
Code.

4

" Act of March 4,1909, ch. 321,

§211,

35

Stat. 1129.
Every obscene, lewd, or lascivious, and
every filthy book, pamphlet, picture, paper,
letter, writing, print, or other publication of
an indecent character, and ...
Every written or printed card, letter, circular, book, pamphlet, advertisement, or notice of any kind giving information directly
or indirectly, where, or how, or from whom,
or by what means any of the hereinbefore
mentioned matters, articles, or things may
be obtained or made, . . . whether sealed or
unsealed; . . . is declared to be nonmailable
matter and shall not be conveyed in the
mails or delivered from any post-office or by
any letter carrier.
Whoever shall knowingly deposit, or cause
to be deposited for mailing or delivery, anything declared by this section to be nonmailable, or shall knowingly take, or cause
the same to be taken, from the mails for
the purpose of circulating or disposing
thereof, or of aiding in the circulation or
disposition thereof, shall be fined not more
than five thousand dollars, or imprisoned
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Mr. Justice Brennan, in the majority
opinion, took up the constitutional issue
first.' He stated that the dispositive
question was whether obscenity was utterance within the area of protected
speech and press. He marshalled an impressive list of cases to support his contention that the Court had always assumed that obscenity was not protected
by the freedoms of speech and press. He
found that the guarantees of freedom of
expression in most of the states which by
1792 had ratified the Constitution gave
no absolute protection for every utterance. A number of these states made
certain types of speech statutory crimes.
The distinguishing mark of protected
speech was its social importance:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the
history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance. 6
Justice Brennan concluded by holding
that obscenity was not within the area
of constitutionally protected speech or
press.'

not more than five years, or both.
The Court noted that the 1955 revision of this
statute, 69 Stat. 183, was not applicable to
the case.
4 CAL. PEN. CODE § 311.
Every person who wilfully and lewdly, either:
3. Writes, composes, stereotypes, prints, publishes, sells, distributes, keeps for sale, or
exhibits any obscene or indecent writing,
paper, or book; or designs, copies, draws,
engraves, paints, or otherwise prepares any
obscene or indecent picture or print; or
molds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any

obscene or indecent figure; or,
4. Writes, composes, or publishes any notice
or advertisement of any such writing, paper,
book, picture, print or figure; . . .
6. . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481
(1957). Justice Brennan was joined by Justices
Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and Whittaker.
6Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957) (citations omitted).
TRoth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485
(1957).
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The majority then disposed of potential constitutional objections to its holding. It rejected contentions that obscene
speech should be judged by the clear and
present danger test of Schenck" or its
variation in Dennis9 by declaring the test
irrelevant in view of the holding that obscenity was not protected speech.
The Court then took up the standards
for judging obscenity. It noted that sex
and obscenity were not synonymous, but
rather that obscenity was material which
dealt with sex in a manner appealing to
prurient interest. It defined prurient interest as material having a tendency to
excite lustful thoughts. It perceived no
significant difference between the meaning
of obscenity developed in the case law
and the definition of the American Law
Institute's Model Penal Code, viz.:
A thing is obscene if, considered as a
whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest, i.e., a shameful or morbid
interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and
if it goes substantially beyond customary
limits of candor in description or representation of such matters.10
The Court found that the following test
had evolved in the American courts:
[W]hether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards,
the dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to prurient interest. 1

8 Schenck

v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
9Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494
(1951).
10 MODEL

PENAL

CODE

§ 207.10(2)

This test implied a rejection of the
English standard known as the Hicklin
test, which allowed material to be judged
merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons. 1 2 The latter test might well encompass material legitimately treating sex,
and therefore was unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech and
press.
Having disposed of the main issues,
Justice Brennan turned to some of the
other arguments put forth by the defendants. He found that the federal obscenity statute and the California statute
gave adequate notice in their language
of what was prohibited, even though different juries might reach different conclusions about the same material, and
therefore did not offend due process requirements. He also rejected Roth's
contention that the first amendment removes obscenity from the range of Congressional power when it states that
"Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press
S. ." and that as a result jurisdiction over
obscenity is reserved by the ninth and
tenth amendments to the states and to
the people. This argument fell in the
light of the Court's previous holding that
obscenity was not expression protected
by the first amendment, and, instead, Justice Brennan held that the postal power
delegated to Congress by Article I of the
Constitution gave Congress the right to
regulate the use of the mails. He then
rejected Alberts' attempt to turn the last

(Tent.

Draft No. 6, 1957).
-Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489
(1957).

12The Queen v. Hicklin, [1868] 3 Q.B. 360,
371.
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argument to Alberts' own favor by alleging that Congress had pre-empted the
regulatory field by enacting the federal
obscenity statute. The federal statute dealt
only with actual mailing; it did not eliminate state power to punish keeping for
sale or advertising obscene material.
Chief Justice Warren, in his concurring opinion, 1 3 took an entirely different
approach to the Roth-Alberts cases. He
did not agree completely with the majority's emphasis on the nature of the material and its effect on its potential audience. A person, not a book, was on trial.
The conduct of the defendant was the
central issue, not the obscenity of a book
or picture. There was relevance, however,
in the nature of the material insofar as it
was an attribute of the defendant's conduct. The context in which such material
was presented was also of great importance, and might affect the result of a
particular case.
In the instant cases, the Chief Justice found that both defendants were engaged in the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised
to appeal to the erotic interest of their
customers. They were plainly engaged in
the commercial exploitation of the morbid and shameful craving for materials
with prurient effect. This was conduct
which the state and federal governments
could constitutionally punish.
Justice Harlan concurred with the re-4
sult in Alberts but dissented in Roth.1

1. Roth
(1957)
'1 Roth
(1957)

v. United
(concurring
v. United
(concurring

States, 354 U.S. 476, 494
opinion).
States, 354 U.S. 476, 496
opinion).
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He saw three basic difficulties in the
majority opinion. First, he was apprehensive that the Court's framing of the constitutional issue in abstract terms and its
holding that obscenity was not protected
because it was utterly without redeeming social importance might make the
question of whether a particular book
was obscene merely a matter of fact to be
entrusted to a fact-finder whose judgment
would not be reviewed by appellate
courts. He emphasized that the suppression of any form of expression was an
individual constitutional problem, and
therefore a reviewing court had to determine for itself whether the attacked expression is suppressible within constitutional standards.
His second difficulty was also of a
constitutional nature and turned on the
scope of the Court's review of state and
federal court decisions. He sustained Alberts' conviction in the California courts
on the grounds that the state legislature,
in making it a misdemeanor to keep for
sale or advertise obscene material, had
used its power rationally and in harmony
with the concept of "ordered liberty"
required by the fourteenth amendment.
But he would not sustain Roth's conviction under the federal obscenity statute
because he could not find a direct substantive interest of the federal government in the control of obscenity. The
dangers of federal censorship, with the
possibility of a nation-wide ban on particular material, were too great. He could
not agree, moreover, that a book which
tended to stir sexual impulses and lead
to sexually impure thoughts was necessarily "utterly without redeeming social
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importance," nor that there was a federal interest in restricting material which
led to any kind of "thoughts." He would
limit the extent of the federal statute to
"hard-core pornography," but not necessarily only to persons engaged in the
business of catering to the prurient minded, even though their wares fell short of
hard-core pornography. The material
distributed by Roth was not hard-core
pornography in his judgment.
Justice Harlan's final difficulty was
with the Court's easy blending of the two
statutes and the Model Penal Code's
definition into one official definition of
obscenity. The California statute said the
book must have a "tendency to deprave or
corrupt its readers." The federal statute
stated it must tend "to stir sexual impulses
and lead to sexually impure thoughts."
The Model Penal Code considered a
thing to be obscene "if, considered as a
whole, its predominant appeal is to prurient interest," but explicitly rejected the
current tests of tendency to arouse lustful
thoughts or desires and tendency to corrupt or debase.
Justice Douglas dissented in both
15
cases, and was joined by Justice Black.

on human conduct, and therefore freedom
of expression was to be preferred. Mere
arousal of thoughts or offense to the
community conscience or appeal to prurient interest had no intrinsic or demonstrable connection with anti-social conduct. The test that suppressed a cheap
tract today could suppress a literary gem

He saw no reason why obscene expression
should be treated any differently from any
other type of expression. Under first
amendment prohibitions, freedom of expression can be suppressed if, and to the
extent that, it is so closely brigaded with
illegal action as to be an inseparable part
of it. There was no dependable information on the effect of obscene literature

3) The range of applicability
"dominant theme" criterion.

15Roth

(1957)

v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508
(concurring opinion).

tomorrow.
II. The Basic Issues
This long exposition of the Roth-Alberts opinions sets the stage for a discussion of the substantive issues involved
in the control of obscenity. Some of
these have been treated in detail in these
opinions, while others were hinted at
vaguely, but all have come to the surface at one time or another in the decade
following Roth.
A listing of these issues will be helpful:
1) The relation of obscenity legislation
to the free speech guarantees of the
first amendment.
2) The purpose of legislation controlling
obscenity.
of the

4) The extent of the relevant community
whose standards are to be applied.
5) The nature and uses of the concept
of social importance as a requirement
for constitutionally protected speech.
6) The relation of obscenity and hardcore pornography.
7) Obscenity as a reality in itself or as
determined by circumstances.
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A. The Constitutional Issue
One of the key issues of the last decade
has been the constitutional one: to what
extent is legislation controlling obscenity
limited by the free speech and press
guarantees of the first amendment?
1. Three Views
Three general constitutional approach-

es have emerged in the Court's discussion of obscenity. The first and the most
consistent has been that of Justices
Douglas and Black which they first stated
in Roth and have repeated in virtually
every subsequent opinion.16 It holds that
obscene speech is to be treated no differently from any other type of speech,

and may be controlled only by application of the clear and present danger test.
Practically speaking, under this position,

all legislation prohibiting obscenity has a
fatal weakness in that there has never
16 Ibid. See also Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp.
v. Regents of the University of the State of
New York, 360 U.S. 684, 690 (concurring
opinion of Justice Black); id. at 697 (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas) (1959);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196 (1964)
(concurring opinion); A Book Named "John
Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure"
v. Atty. Gen. of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,
424 (1966) (concurring opinion of Justice
Douglas); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463, 476 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Black); id. at 482 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S.
502, 515 (1966) (dissenting opinion of Justice
Black).
Prior to Roth the same position was adopted
by Judge Bok in Commonwealth v. Gordon,
66 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949), aff'd sub nom.
Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super.
120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950), and by Judge Frank
in his concurring opinion in Roth in the lower
courts. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796,
801 (2d Cir. 1956).
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been clear and definite evidence that obscene material is linked causally with
anti-social conduct.
The usefulness of this test depends on
the opportunity for counter-persuasion
afforded after the speech has been uttered. But the test is not appropriate in
the cases of obscenity, where the harm
is such that a corrective cannot be
17
sought through countervailing speech.
The Black-Douglas position, moreover,
is legally insignificant and politically unrealistic, in Professor Magrath's opinion. 8
It has not attracted a single Justice to it
of the thirteen who have served on the
Court since Butler v. Michigan,19 and the
lower federal and state judiciary have
little sympathy for it. More important,
there is in this country a governmental
and popular consensus in favor of antiobscenity control.
In contrast to the absolutist BlackDouglas position, Mr. Justice Harlan insisted in Roth on a "balancing of interests" approach.2 0 As noted above, each
case involves an individual constitutional
judgment. It is also important whether
the interests are state or federal.
The third approach among members of
the Court, and the prevailing one, is set
21
forth by Mr. Justice Brennan in Roth.
It finds in the history of the first amend17 p.

FREUND,

THE

SUPREME

COURT

OF

THE

44 (1961).
's Magrath,
The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of
Roth, THE SUP. CT. REV. 7, 57 (P. Kurland

UNITED

ed.

STATES

1966).

'9352 U.S. 380 (1957).
20Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 504
(1957)
2J Roth
(1957).

(concurring and dissenting opinions).
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481
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ment certain types of speech which the
amendment was not intended to protect.
According to Mr. Justice Brennan, "[t]he
protection given speech and press was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people."22 Obscenity, like libel, lacked social
importance and therefore was not within
the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press.
Support for this conclusion was found
23
in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene .... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are
of such slight social value as a step to
truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and mor24
ality.

Kalven describes this approach
two-level speech theory:

as a

At one level there are communications
which, even though odious to the majority opinion of the day, even though
expressive of the thought we hate, are
entitled to be measured against the clearand-present danger criterion. At another
level are communications apparently so
worthless as not to require any extensive
judicial effort to determine whether they
can be prohibited. .

.

. In determining

the constitutionality of any ban on a
communication, the first question is
whether it belongs to a category that
has any social utility. If it does not, it
may be banned. If it does, there is a
further question of measuring the clarity
and proximity and gravity of any danger
from it. It is thus apparent that the issue
of social utility of a communication has
become as crucial a part of our theory
25
as the issue of its danger.
The Brennan rationale has provoked

much criticism. Kauper questions his use
of history as justification for excluding
obscenity from the category of constitutionally prohibited speech.2 6 On the same
reasoning profanity and sacrilege could
still be treated as crimes.

Reliance on the Chaplinsky dictum is
also questionable. Mr. Justice Murphy's
unprotected classes of speech-the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous,
and the insulting or "fighting words"have a common element: by their very
utterance they inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.
Justice Murphy apparently relied heavily
on Chafee 28 who held that these classes
of speech fell outside the protection of the
first amendment, not because they existed
at common law before the Constitution
nor on the historical fact that the framers
of the Constitution wanted to safeguard

political discussion, but because they in-

25Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, THE SUP. CT. REV. 1, 11 (P.
Kurland ed. 1960).
26 P.

22 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957).
23315 U.S. 568 (1942).
24 1d. at 571-72 (emphasis by the Court).

27

KAUPER,

CIVIL

LIBERTIES AND

THE

CON-

STITUTION 67 (1962).
27

KALVEN,

28 Z.

supra note 25, at 9.

CHAFEE,

STATES

149-50

FREE

(1941).

SPEECH

IN

THE

UNITED
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flicted present injury upon listeners,
readers, or those defamed. 29 In this
sense words are similar to acts. But this
rationale poses difficulties. If one grants
the distinction of Mr. Justice Murphy
and Professor Chafee between words involving the exposition of ideas and those
inflicting immediate injury or inviting immediate reaction, is the distinction one
which guarantees full protection to the
former class? What is the injury inflicted
by obscenity? If it is to the social interest
in order and morality, do we not have an
"establishment of religion" problem? 30 Is
there really a close similarity between the
impact of obscenity and that of "fighting
31
words" or libel?

of the first amendment, which holds that
speech unrelated to religious or political
freedom, such as obscene speech, occupies a less favored position with regard to
33
first amendment protection.
One writer 34 finds another difficulty in
the dictum of the Court in a recent libel
case:

The linking of protected speech with
the interchange of ideas for the bringing
about of political and social change seems
to limit too much the purposes of the
first amendment. There is no denying the
fact that the free speech and press guarantees are closely related to the political
process. But this is not the same as saying that only communications relevant to
the political process are protected. As
Kalven notes, "[t]he people do not need
novels or dramas or paintings or poems
because they will be called upon to
vote. ' 32 The Brennan position is reminiscent of the Meiklejohn interpretation

From this statement he concludes that
"the Supreme Court has declared that
all speech must be measured by the same
standards." Arguably, however, all the
Court is saying is that there are constitutional standards which must be met to
justify a limitation on expression, not that
these standards are the same for all
classes of expression. Thus the clear and
present danger test may be used for certain types of speech, while the social
utility criterion is equally applicable to
another type such as obscenity.

29 Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75
YALE L.J. 1364, 1367 n.19 (1966).
30Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The
Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 395

(1963).
31 Monaghan,
Obscenity, 1966: The Marriage
of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod,
76 YALE L.J. 127, 132 (1966).
32 Supra note 25, at 16.

Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of
unlawful acts, breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of illegal business,
and the various other formulae for the
repression of expression that have been
challenged in this Court, libel can claim
no talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by
standards that satisfy the First Amend35

ment.

2. The Purposes of Obscenity
Legislation
If we accept for the moment the Roth
majority's adoption of social utility as the
a3Note, Obscenity and The Supreme Court:
Nine Years of Confusion, 19 STAN. L. REV. 167,
175 (1966).
34 Ibid.
35 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S.
254, 269 (1964).
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acceptable criterion for constitutionally
protected speech, we may rightly ask the
rationale for the conclusion that obscenity, however defined, is socially worthless.
Or to put the question a different way,
what is there about obscenity which makes
it socially worthless? The Court never
discusses this point, but various theories
have been proposed to explain this lack
of social worth and thus to justify the
legislative regulation of obscenity. But before going into them, we must put to one
side one impermissible ground for declaring obscenity socially worthless. This
ground is that obscenity advocates improper sexual values. The Supreme Court
disposed of this point in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of
36
the University of the State of New York,
when it held that the denial of a license
to a motion picture, Lady Chatterly's
Lover, advocating that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior, violated the freedom to advocate
ideas guaranteed by the first amendment.
The first of the possible grounds justifying legislation directed against obscenity is the popular impression that obscenity leads to anti-social sexual behavior and
crime. The difficulty with this position is
that it is supported only with opinion
evidence, but has never been proven on
the basis of empirical evidence. In his
dissent in Roth, Mr. Justice Douglas takes
up the issue for the first time. In his
judgment it was "by no means clear that
obscene literature . . . is a significant
factor in influencing substantial devia-

tions from the community standards....
The absence of dependable information
• . . should put us on the side of protecting society's interest in literature. ' 37 He
again argued this point in his concurring
4
opinion in Memoirs v. Massachusetts."
He relied primarily on the Cairns, Paul
and Wishner survey, 39 the first Lockhart
and McClure article, 40 the study prepared
by Dr. Jahoda for Judge Frank,41 and
Judge Bok's opinion in Commonwealth v.
Gordon.4 2 He went further to speculate
that pornography might provide in some
cases a substitute instead of a stimulus
43
for anti-social sexual conduct.
The Douglas statement in Memoirs
provoked a lengthy response from Mr.
Justice Clark. 44 In support of the proposition that the sexual stimulation caused
by pornography frequently manifests itself in criminal sexual behavior or other
anti-social conduct, he cites the testimony

37Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 510-11

(1957).
38383 U.S. 413 (1965).
Paul & Wishner, Sex Censorship:
The Assumptions of Anti-Obscenity Laws and
the Empirical Evidence, 46 MINN. L. REV.
3. Cairns,

1009 (1962).
Lockhart & McClure, Literature, The Law
of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN.
40

L. REV. 295, 382-87 (1954).
41A summary of this study is reprinted

in
United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 815-16
(2d Cir. 1956)

(concurring opinion).

4266 Pa. D. & C. 101 (1949), aft'd sub nom.
Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super.
120, 70 A.2d 389 (1950).
4, See Murphy, The Value of Pornography, 10
WAYNE L. REV. 655 (1964).

44Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413,
36

360 U.S. 684 (1959).

451-53

(1965)

(dissenting opinion).
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of psychologists,"9 sociologists, 4 6 criminolo48
and the clergy4 9
gists, 4 7 public officials,
as well as the fact that Congress and
every state legislature has passed antiobscenity laws, justifying these controls
by reference to evidence that anti-social
behavior may result in part from reading
obscenity.
The end result of this controversy is to
leave it equally established that the causal
link has been neither demonstrated nor
disproven. Whether this places the burden
of proof on those who favor obscenity
laws or those who disapprove of them is
equally up in the air. Someone has observed that the only way in which the
controversy will be resolved will be to
take groups of children, expose half of
them to obscenity, control all other conditions, and wait for the results.5 0 Parents
dedicated so wholeheartedly to empirical
research in human conduct are not, however, expected to rush to enlist their
children.
4 Cairns,

Paul & Wishner, supra note 39,
which apparently can be cited for either side
of the argument; WERTHAM, SEDUCTION OF THE
INNOCENT 164 (1954); Henry, Testimony before the Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency,
S. REP. No. 2381, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-12
(1956).
46 SOROKIN,

THE

AMERICAN

SEX

REVOLUTION

(1956).

47Case, Testimony before the House Select
Committee on Current Pornographic Materials,
H.R. REP. No. 2510, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 62
(1952).
48 Hoover, Combating Merchants of Filth: The
Role of the F.B.I., 25 U. PITr. L. REV. 469
(1964); Hoover, The Fight Against Filth,
AMERICAN LEGION MAGAZINE, May, 1961.
49Cardinal

Spellman;

ROLPH,

DOES
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Another ground for obscenity legislation is the offense which it offers to the
sensibilities of the community. This is
analogous to laws against "nuisances."
This analysis would support state action
against obscenity in the same way as the
state may forbid nudity, indecent exposure, graffiti, public fornication and public excretions. The trouble with the nuisance theory, however, is that it assumes
that a person has been involuntarily exposed to the obscene material. It does
not support legislation prohibiting the
distribution of obscene material to those
who voluntarily seek it out. Nor does it
square completely with the Roth approach
which is concerned chiefly with the material itself nor with the Ginzburg doctrine concerning commercial exploitation
of material toward a willing audience.
A final argument supporting obscenity
legislation is one rarely discussed by the
Supreme Court. Justice Harlan alluded
to it in his opinion in Alberts:
The State can reasonably draw the inference that over a long period of time the
indiscriminate dissemination of materials,
the essential character of which is to degrade sex, will have an eroding effect
1
on moral standards.5
This argument may be interpreted in
two ways. Some see obscenity as a threat
to personal integrity:
We submit that there is a social effect resulting from the individual's personal
sexual reaction to the object, which
could (not out of necessity) be revealed
in the guise of triggered aggression or

PORNOG-

RAPHY MATTER 47-48 (1961).

51 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 502

-OMagrath, supra note 18, at 55.

(1957)

(concurring opinion).
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other form of anti-social conduct; yet
we are prepared to admit that this specific response is less likely than inducements to regressive social behavior which
will eventually debilitate personal integrity. Assuming that the natural sexual
structure necessarily involves two persons-an interpersonal relationship-we
perceive the fact that inherent danger
lurks in any substitution of the obscene
object for the other person. Media which
induce a congeries of fantasies and frustrations of their very nature threaten a
of personal weakness,
reinforcement
which may in turn have the unsalutary
effect of turning a person's sexual
response back toward self. In summing
up we see in obscenity a threat to the
52
personal and the social structure.
What these authors seem to be saying
is that obscenity leads to auto-erotic
stimulation, a type of sexual activity
which is undesirable, and therefore government should

control the distribution

of obscene material. 53 This analysis
raises many problems. Is it just another
form of the "obscenity-behavior" connection which has never been adopted by
the Court? Is there any more proof for
the connection between obscenity and
auto-erotic stimulation than there is for
between obscenity and sex
crimes? Or if not, need there be? What
is the governmental interest in controlling
sexual
good
stimulation,
auto-erotic
the

link

health or good morals?
The last point leads us to the second
interpretation of the Harlan dictum.
Professor Louis Henkin argues that ob-

scenity is suppressed primarily because
52 Slough & McAnany, Obscenity and Constitutional Freedom-Part 11, 8 ST. Louis L.
REV. 449, 457 (1964).
53

See also Kalven, supra note 25, at 4 n.21.

it corrupts morals and character, "for the
purity of the community and for the
salvation and welfare of the 'consumer.'
Obscenity, at bottom, is not crime. Obscenity is sin."' 54 He then suggests that

some of the assumptions for the enactment of morals legislation by the state
be re-examined. His inquiry began with
three hypotheses which are at the same
time his conclusions:
First: even if the freedom of speech
protected by the first and fourteenth
amendments does not include a freedom
to communicate obscene speech, suppression of obscenity is still a deprivation of
liberty or property-of the person who
would indulge in it, at least-which requires due process of law. Due process
of law demands that legislation have
a proper public purpose; only an apparent, rational, utilitarian social purpose
satisfies due process. A state may not
legislate merely to preserve some traditional or prevailing view of private morality.
Second: due process requires, as well,
that means be reasonably related to proper public ends. Legislation cannot be
based on unfounded hypotheses and assumptions about character and its corruption.
Third: moral legislation is a relic in the
law of our religious heritage; the Constitution forbids such establishment of
religion. 55
This analysis has not been found completely persuasive. 6 Henkin himself admits that some utilitarian ends can be
found for morals legislation, even though
they be rationalizations. 5 1 Such rationali54Supra
55 Id. at
56 Supra
57Supra

note 30, at 395.
402.
note 31, at 138.
note 30, at 404.
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zations, however, might well meet the
"minimum rationality" standards of due
process cases. Moreover, the state is not
limited to passing legislation interfering
with individual liberty only to restrain
conduct threatening others; there is
nothing to prohibit it from promoting
virtue among its citizens.
The draftsmen of the Model Penal
Code have attempted to meet the objections that Henkin raises by shifting
the legislative target from the "sin of
obscenity" to a disapproved form of
economic activity-commercial exploitation of the widespread weakness for
titillation by pornography. 8
This approach will be discussed later, but regardless of its merits and its actual use by
the Court in Ginzburg, the Supreme
Court's support for obscenity legislation
on constitutional grounds goes far beyond
prohibitions against behavior of a commercial nature.
This discussion of the purposes of
obscenity legislation and the speculation
which it necessarily involves points up,
if nothing else, the need for the Supreme
Court to elaborate on its reasons for
considering obscenity "socially worthless."59
B. Definitional Issues
No matter which of the three constitutional positions one takes on obscenity
legislation, one still must determine the
nature of the obscene and this leads
inevitably to the problem of defining it.
98

§§251.4(2) (d), (e)
& (4) (e) (Official Draft, 1962). See also
Schwartz, Morals Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677 (1963).
5 See Note, supra note 29, at 1403.
MODEL

PENAL

CODE
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The English courts formulated the first
obscenity test in 1868 in The Queen v.
Hicklin:
The test of obscenity is this, whether the
tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to deprave and corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.60
This test, despite its inadequacies,
gained acceptance in the American courts
until the Ulysses case in 1934.61 In denying a motion of the United States for
a decree declaring the book not importable into the country on the ground that
it was obscene matter under the Tariff
Act of 1930 and for the seizure and
destruction of the book under the Act,
Judge Woolsey defined obscenity as
material "tending to stir the sex impulses
or to lead to sexually impure and lustful
thoughts. ' 62 He declared that the author's
motive in writing the book was relevant
in deciding whether the book was written
for the purpose of exploiting obscenity,
even though this intent was not the test
of obscenity.
The court should also
consider the book's effect on the person
with average sex instincts, just as it
would use the "reasonable man" test in
a tort action. The trier of fact was also
required to read the entire work rather
than isolated passages.

60 [1868] 3 Q.B. 360, 371.
61United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"
5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), afl'd, 72 F.2d
705 (2d Cir. 1934).
62 United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses,"
5 F. Supp. 182, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
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In affirming this decision, Judge
Augustus N. Hand formulated this test:

candor in description or representation
of such matters."6 9

[W]e believe that the proper test of
whether a given book is obscene is its
dominant effect. In applying this test,
relevancy of the objectionable parts to
the theme, the established reputation of
the work in the estimation of approved
critics, if the book is modern, and the
verdict of the past, if it is ancient, are
63
persuasive pieces of evidence ....

The emphasis at this point in the
evolution of the test is on the material
itself. Material is obscene when it takes
on certain characteristics. Context and
setting at this stage are not relevant.
Before passing on to a discussion of
whether material may be judged obscene because of extrinsic factors, it is
necessary to examine more closely some
of the elements in the definition.

The definitional problem first reached
the Supreme Court in 1957 in Roth .

4

To be obscene, according to Justice Brennan, material had to be "utterly without
redeeming social importance" and measured against the norm: "Whether to the
average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals
to a prurient interest." '
Justice Harlan grafted another element
on the Roth definition in 1962 in Manual
Enterprises v. Day.6" In addition to possessing the requisite prurient appeal,
material to be obscene must be "patently
offensive," that is, on its face it must
affront current community standards of
decency."
Justice Brennan stated this
element of the test in a different way in
Jacobellis v. Ohio.6s Material must go
"substantially beyond customary limits of

63United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705, 708 (2d Cir. 1934), affirming 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
64 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
c5 Id. at 482.
66 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
67 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
482 (1962).
66378 U.S. 184 (1964).

1. Dominant Theme
Since the Roth decision, the only appearance of the "dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole" requirement
occurs in the Court's opinion in Ginzburg
v. United States.7 ° The appellant had
argued that the trial judge had improperly
found the magazine Eros to be obscene
as a whole, because he had concluded
that only four of the fifteen articles were
obscene. What made Eros as a whole
obscene for the trial judge was its
deliberate and studied arrangement, editorialized for the purpose of appealing
to prurient interest but including nonoffensive material to insulate it from
attack. Justice Brennan's response to
the trial judge's opinion is curious:
"However erroneous such a conclusion
might be if supported by the evidence
of pandering, the record here supports
it. .

.

. By animating sensual detail to

give the publication a salacious cast,
petitioners reinforced what is conceded
by the Government to be an otherwise
69 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
70383 U.S. 463 (1966).
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debatable conclusion."'71 This answer does
not meet the issue head on; the Court
seems determined to get on with its
"commercialization" theme.
What if there had been no evidence
of pandering? The dominant theme test
is clear enough when applied to a unified
work, but is vague when applied to works
of a disparate nature joined together for
extrinsic purposes. It is easy to deal
with the mailing of an obscene picture
packaged with non-obscene pictures, because the objects are separable and
capable of independent publication. But
the ordinary magazine dealing with diverse subjects is the hard case. To permit
publication of the magazine containing
one obscene article or picture mingled
with non-obscene material would provide
an open market to the purveyor of obscenity. An article-by-article approach
seems more reasonable in contrast to the
above procedure, but it does result,
practically speaking, in the suppression
of a certain amount of non-obscene
material.
2. Contemporary Community
Standards
In Roth the Supreme Court did not
elaborate on the requirement that obscenity be determined according to "contemporary community standards."
Justice Harlan took up the question in
Manual Enterprises and, joined by Justice
Stewart, he argued that the proper test
under a federal statute was a national
standard of decency. A local standard
would have
7'Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
471 (1966).

the intolerable consequence of denying
some sections of the country access to
material, there deemed acceptable, which
in others might be considered offensive to
prevailing community standards of de2

cency.1

The Jacobellis case provides an interesting debate on the national versus
local standard issue. Chief Justice Warren, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, opted
for the local one:
I believe that there is no provable 'national standard,' and perhaps there should
be none. . . . [T]his Court has not been
able to enunciate one, and it would be
unreasonable to expect local courts to
divine one.

73

But Justices Brennan and Goldberg
held out for the national standard.
Developing Justice Harlan's reasoning,
they argued:
To sustain the suppression of a particular book or film in one locality would
deter its dissemination in other localities where it might not be held obscene,
since sellers and exhibitors would be reluctant to risk criminal conviction in
testing the variation between the two
places ...
It is true that local communities
throughout the land are in fact diverse.
... Communities vary, however, in many
respects other than their toleration of alleged obscenity, and such variances have
never been considered to require or justify a varying standard of application of
the Federal Constitution. . . . It is, after
all, a national Constitution we are ex4
pounding.
72 Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
488 (1962).
73 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964)
(dissenting opinion).
74Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194-95
(1964) (dissenting opinion).
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No further references to the question
occur in later cases, and thus far, of the
Justices presently on the Supreme Court,
only three have spoken on the issue,
with Justice Brennan favoring the national
standard, Justice Harlan allowing it when
federal statutes are involved, and the
Chief Justice adopting local standards.
It seems likely that the national standard
will be followed by state and lower federal
courts because of a tendency to adopt
the dicta in first opinions in obscenity
decisions even though not supported by
the majority of the Court.7 5 But one
writer believes that the community standards requirement no longer has any
vitality since the Ginzburg decision. "[A]
national standard which varies from setting to setting depending on the 'manner
of sale' will be no standard at all."7 6
3. Social Importance
In Roth, Justice Brennan had stated
that in order to be obscene, material had
to be "utterly without redeeming social
importance." In Jacobellis he had pointed
out that the "social importance" test
was independent of the "prurient appeal"
element, and therefore one could not be
weighed against the other. Finally, in
Memoirs,77 a full-blown discussion of the

- See Church-State-Religious Institutions and
Values: A Legal Survey-1964-66, 41 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 681, 759-60 (1966).
76 Silber, The Supreme Court and Obscenity:
The Ginzburg
Test-Restriction oj
First
Amendment Freedoms Through Loss of Predictability, 21 RUTGERs L. REV. 56, 65 (1966).
77A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Atty. Gen. of
Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).

"social importance" requirement developed.
This case presented the issue whether
the book "Fanny Hill" was obscene under
the Roth definition of obscenity. At the
hearing in the trial court, the court had
received the book in evidence and had
heard the testimony of experts and accepted other evidence such as book reviews to assess the literary, cultural and
educational character of the book. Some
of these experts testified that the book
was, in their opinion, a minor "work
of art" having "literary merit," "historical
value," and a good deal of "deliberate,
calculated comedy," and was a piece of
"social history of interest to anyone who
is interested in fiction as a way of
understanding society in the past." The
court was unimpressed and found the
book obscene, and the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the
decree.
The Supreme Court reversed this judgment by a 6-3 majority, but the Justices
were unable to agree on an opinion of
the Court and the majority needed four
opinions to say why they disagreed with
the Massachusetts court. The discussion
centered around the "social importance"
requirement.
Justice Brennan, joined by the Chief
Justice and Justice Fortas, insisted that
Roth and subsequent decisions had laid
down a threefold test for obscenity:
[I]t must be established that (a) the
dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
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matters; and (c) the material is utterly
78
without redeeming social value.
The mistake of the Massachusetts
court was to discover in "Fanny Hill"
a modicum of social value but still to
declare it obscene. Brennan countered
that a book cannot be obscene unless
it is found to be utterly without redeeming
social importance even though it had the
requisite prurient appeal and patent offensiveness. Moreover, each of the three
federal constitutional criteria was to be
applied independently. Social value could
not be balanced against prurient appeal
or patent offensiveness. Of course, he
added, if "Fanny Hill" were found to
have only a minimum of social value
and was being commercially exploited,
it might be found obscene, but the production. sale and publicity of the book
were not at issue in this case.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Clark
strongly disagreed with the "social value"
test used in the Brennan opinion19 He
described it as a "new test" imported
into the Roth test by Justice Brennan for
the first time in the Jacobellis case where
he was joined only by Justice Goldberg,
and now in the instant case. According
to Justice Clark, the Roth test includes
only two constitutional requirements: (1)
the book must be judged as a whole,
not by its parts; and (2) it must be
judged in terms of its appeal to the
prurient interest of the average person,
applying contemporary community standards.8 0
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Even assuming that the "social value"
test has some merit, he argued further
that the Brennan opinion erred in using
as the basis for reversal the statement
of the Supreme Judicial Court that this
test does not require "that a book which
appeals to prurient interest and is patently offensive must be unqualifiedly
worthless' before it can be deemed obscene." '
He noted that the trial court
specifically found that the book has "no
value because of ideas, news or artistic,
literary or scientific attributes." He also
took issue with Justice Douglas' assertion
that there is no proof that obscenity produces anti-social conduct. He argued that
if social value may "redeem" an otherwise
worthless book, then the courts may
balance esthetic merit against the harmful
consequences that may flow from pornography. In one final thrust, he believed that "Fanny Hill" could be found
to be obscene under the "commercial
exploitation" test of Ginzburg and Mishkin.
Justice White's dissent also severely
criticized the "social value" test used in
Justice Brennan's opinion. 2 Once the
predominant theme of a publication appeals to the prurient interest in a manner
exceeding customary limits of candor, the
material is ipso facto without redeeming
social importance. Minor elements in the
publication, such as literary style, historical references or language characteristic
of a bygone day, cannot overcome the
character of a book as fixed by its predominant theme. Social value is there-

78 Id. at 418.
70
80

Id. at 441 (dissenting opinion).
Id. at 442 (dissenting opinion).
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Id. at 445 (dissenting opinion).

82

Id. at 460 (dissenting opinion).
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fore not an independent test, but relevant
only to determining the predominant
prurient interest of the material.
Thus we have three Justices who look
on social value as an independent criterion, a fourth, Justice Harlan, who will
accept it as such in federal cases, and a
fifth, Justice Stewart, who considers it
relevant only when "hard-core pornography" is involved. Two Justices, Clark
and White, fail to see its independence,
and two others, Justices Black and
Douglas, continue to adhere through the
storm to the "Black-Douglas" position.
What is social value? In Jacobellis,
Justice Brennan defined it partially as
material that has "literary or scientific
or artistic value."8 3 Some find such a
broad definition, particularly in an age
of form-centered esthetics, as in fact
limiting the Roth definition of obscenity
to "hard-core pornography. ' 84
Justice
White seemed even more pessimistic:
If 'social importance' is to be used as the
prevailing opinion uses it today, obscene
material, however far beyond customary
limits of candor, is immune if it has
any literary style, if it contains any historical references or language characteristic of a bygone day, or even if it is
printed or bound in an interesting way.
Well written, especially effective obscenity is protected; the poorly written is
vulnerable. And why shouldn't the fact
that some people buy and read such material prove its 'social value'?8 5

8, Supra note 69.
84 Supra note 75,

at 768.

85 A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of
a Woman of Pleasure" v. Atty. Gen. of Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 461 (1966) (dissenting

opinion).

The Brennan opinion also raises a
semantic question about social value.
The Massachusetts courts had found a
"modicum" of social value in "Fanny
Hill," and this was enough to save it
from being banned. But if the trial
record had shown that the book had
only a "minimum" of social value and
if there had then been evidence that the
book was being commercially exploited
for the sake of prurient appeal to the
exclusion of all other values, then the
Court might have been justified in concluding that the book was utterly without
redeeming social importance. Do "modicum" and "minimum" mean the same
thing? Justice Brennan does not indicate
one way or the other, and it would seem
logical that they are identical.
One
author, however, develops an interesting
theory based on the premise that they
mean different things:
The crucial quantum in the social value
calculus is the 'minimum': the implication of Mr. Justice Brennan's thesis is
that once a work is found to possess
more than a minimum of social value, it
cannot be suppressed, even with evidence
of pandering. 383 U.S. at 420. But we
are never told how much a minimum
is. Knowing where Fanny Hill lies on the
social value scale with reference to the
minimum point might help to determine
what 'minimum' means, but that is impossible for several reasons. First, we
cannot be sure that Mr. Justice Brennan
agrees with the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court that Memoirs does have a
modicum of value, because his disposition of the case made it unnecessary for
him to consider that question. See Harlan, J., dissenting, 383 U.S. at 459 & n.4.
Second, even if Mr. Justice Brennan had
adopted the Massachusetts findings, we
still would be unable to say where a
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modicum stood in relation to the minimum-whether it was more, or less, or
the same. If a modicum is greater than
a minimum, then the entire first half
of the Brennan opinion was unnecessary
because, according to the second half,
the Massachusetts holding could not
stand even with evidence of pandering.
If a modicum is less than a minimum,
the matter becomes even more confusing: since it is impossible to draw from
the modicum passage,- which appears in
the context of the 'utterly' language,
the inference that any work can be suppressed so long as it contains less than a
modicum but more than none at all and
is not affected with pandering, it is impossible to say that pandering evidence
is relevant only where the social value is
less than a minimum but more than a
modicum (because above the minimum
pandering would be useless, and below a
modicum it would be unnecessary). If
pandering is relevant all the way from a
minimum down to the point where the
challenged work has 'utterly' no redeeming value,-as seems to be the case,then one suspects that as the social quality of the work approaches zero (supposing that no work can be totally devoid
of value of some sort), evidence of
pandering will become unnecessary to
achieve suppression of the work. Thus a
fourth level, different from zero, modicum, and minimum, becomes important,
and perhaps as crucial as the minimum
level. The answer to the last problem
depends, perhaps, on whether social
value comes in individual streams or discrete quanta.86
4.

What Kind of Material?

When one sorts out the various kinds
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arise. The Roth-Alberts decision never
came to grips with the obscenity of the
material involved. In subsequent cases
the following items were held not to be
obscene: (1) motion pictures containing
explicit love scenes;87 (2) nudist magazines and nude photographs; 88 (3) magazines containing male nudes designed to
appeal to homosexuals; 9 (4) a book
with graphic descriptions of sexual detailsY0 On the contrary, the only materials
the Court has found obscene were (1)
the publications in Ginzburg which admittedly presented only a "close case"
and were considered obscene only because of the publisher's pandering; 91 (2)
the deviant materials in Mishkin.9The paucity of obscene material according to Court standards led Lockhart
and McClure to suggest in 1960 that
the Court really was not talking about
the ordinary garden variety of obscenity
but about "hard-core pornography." 9They defined the latter as "daydream

87 Jacobellis

v.

Ohio,

378

U.S.

184

(1964);

Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355
U.S. 35 (1958), reversing 244 F.2d 432 (7th
Cir. 1957).
88 Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U.S.

372 (1958), reversing 249 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir.
1957); Mounce v. United States, 355 U.S. 180
(1957).

s88One, Inc. v. Olesen, 355 U.S. 371

(1958),

reversing 241 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1957); Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478
(1962).
90 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966).

not to be obscene, some new questions

91Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
474-75 (1966).
92 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966).

Dirty Books, 75
YALE L.J. 1364, 1382 n.64 (1966).

93Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REv. 5, 58 (1960).

of material which the Court has held

86 Note, More Ado About
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material, divorced from reality, whose
main or sole purpose is to nourish erotic
fantasies or . . . psychic autoeroticism
. . . [and which] must be grossly shocking as well."9 4 In the same year Kalven
cited with approval Thurman Arnold's
advice to the Supreme Court: "The
Court should hold the items before it
not obscene unless they amount to hardcore pornography, and should, after rendering a decision, shut up. In Mr.
Arnold's view, any fool can quickly recognize hard-core pornography, but it is a
fatal trap for judicial decorum and judicial sanity to attempt thereafter to write
an opinion explaining why." '
The New York Court of Appeals
reached the conclusion a year later that
obscenity meant "hard-core pornography"
and defined it thusly:
It focuses predominantly upon what is
sexually morbid, grossly perverse and
bizarre, without any artistic or scientific
purpose or justification.. . . [T]he obscene
is the vile, rather than the coarse, the
blow to sense, not merely to sensibility.
It smacks, at times, of fantasy and unreality, of sexual perversion and sickness
and represents . . . 'a debauchery of the
sexual faculty.' 96
Justice Harlan acknowledged this line of
thought in Manual Enterprises but refused to decide whether obscenity was the
9
same thing as "hard-core pornography." '

Justice Stewart, however, in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis, took Mr.
Arnold's advice, said the two were the
same, and "defined" it masterfully: "I
know it when I see it."98 The Chief Justice and Justice Clark acknowledged their
lack of such perception and asked who
could define hard-core pornography with
any greater clarity than obscenity. 99 And
thus the dispute stood until Redrup v.
New York, 00 which is discussed later.
5. Average Person
Basic to the Roth test is the rejection
of the Hicklin standard which allowed
material to be judged by its effect upon
particularly susceptible persons. 10 1 The
Court had already given constitutional
sanction to the rejection in Butler v.
Michigan.10 2 In Roth the Court spoke
instead of the average man norm.
a. The Deviant Audience
Two questions arise: 1) does this test
preclude prohibitions against the dissemination of material appealing to the
prurient interest of deviant persons; 2)
is legislation designed to protect only
children constitutionally valid?
Lockhart and McClure had suggested
that "the reference to the average or normal person was simply a slip of the
tongue, an expression of disapproval of
the Hicklin rule's reference to particularly

94 d. at 65-66.
95 Kalven, The Metaphysics of the Law of
Obscenity, THE SUP. CT. REV. 43 (P. Kurland

9s Jacobellis v.
(1964).

ed. 1960).
96 People v. Richmond County News, Inc.,

9 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964)

9 N.Y.2d 578, 587, 175 N.E.2d 681, 686, 216

100 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
101 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489

N.Y.S.2d 369, 376 (1961).
9' Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
489 (1962).

Ohio, 378

U.S.

184,

197

(dissenting opinion).
(1957).

1021Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
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susceptible persons."' 0 They proposed
that the Supreme Court really meant a
concept of variable obscenity:

sion' 0 6 and the New York Court of Ap-

Under variable obscenity, material is
judged by its appeal to and effect upon
the audience to which the material is
primarily directed. In this view, material
is never inherently obscene; instead, its
obscenity varies with the circumstances
of its dissemination. Material may be obscene when directed to one class of persons but not when directed to another.

Five Justices joined in the opinion
of the Court which was written by Justice Brennan, the first such majority
since the Roth case dealing with a substantive obscenity question. After rejecting the argument that the term "obscene"
was impermissibly vague, the Court held:
Where the material is designed for and
primarily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, rather than
the public at large, the prurient-appeal
requirement of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the
prurient interest in sex of the members
of that group. The reference to the
'average' or 'normal' person in Roth . . .

.

.

.

Variable obscenity also makes it

possible to reach, under obscenity statutes, the panderer who advertises and
pushes non-pornographic material as if it
were hard-core pornography, seeking
out an audience of the sexually immature who bring their 'pornographic intent
to something which is not itself porno0
graphic."

4

Material appealing primarily to homosexuals came before the Court in Manual Enterprises but the Court did not
reach the issue of applying the average
man norm to it. The issue returned
again, however, in Mishkin v. New
York. 105 Here the appellant had been
found guilty of violating Section 1141 of
the New York Penal Law by hiring
others to prepare obscene books, by
publishing them himself, and by possessing them with intent to sell them. The
books portrayed sexuality in many guises, some depicting relatively normal heterosexual relations, but more dealt with
such deviations as sado-masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality. The convictions
had been affirmed by the appellate divi-

103lLockhart

101

& McClure, supra note 93, at 73.

Id. at 77.

10',383 U.S. 502 (1966).

peals.107 The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision.

does not foreclose this holding. 108

Citing the Lockhart-McClure interpretation of Roth given above, 10 9 Brennan
continued:

[T]he concept of the 'average' or 'normal' person was employed in Roth to
serve the essentially negative purpose of
expressing our rejection of that aspect of
the Hicklin test . . . that made the impact on the most susceptible person determinative. We adjust the prurient-appeal requirement to social realities by
permitting the appeal of this type of
material to be assessed in terms of the
sexual interests of its intended and prob106 17

App. Div. 2d 243,
(1st Dep't 1962).
107 15
N.Y.2d 671, 204

N.Y.S.2d 881 (1964),

234 N.Y.S.2d

342

N.E.2d

255

209,

remittitur amended, 15

N.Y.2d 724, 205 N.E.2d 201, 256 N.Y.S.2d 936
(1965).
108 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508
(1966).
109

Lockhart & McClure, supra note 93, at 77.
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ably recipient group; and since our holding requires that the recipient group be
defined with more specificity than in
terms of sexually immature persons, it
also avoids the inadequacy of the mostsusceptible-person facet of the Hicklin
test.110
In an interesting footnote comment,
Brennan noted that "[o]ur discussion of
definition [in Roth] was not intended to
develop all the nuances of a definition
required by the constitutional guarantees."'11 Such clear acknowledgment of
the development of the obscenity doctrine
through subsequent cases would do much,
if applied in other areas, to eliminate
much of the Court's painful exegesis of
the gospel according to Roth.
The Mishkin case marked an important
change in the Court's approach to obscenity by shifting the emphasis from the
material itself to the intent of the publisher. The Court looked at conduct instead of a book by itself. Brennan developed this point at some length:
Appellant instructed his authors and
artists to prepare the books expressly to
induce their purchase by persons who
would probably be sexually stimulated by
them. It was for this reason that appellant 'wanted an emphasis on beatings
and fetishism and clothing-irregular
clothing, and that sort of thing, and
again sex scenes between women; always
sex scenes had to be very strong.' And
to be certain that authors fulfilled his
purpose, appellant furnished them with
such source materials as Caprio, Varia-

tions in Sexual Behavior, and
Ebing, Psychopathia Sexualis.112

Much of the importance of Mishkin
lies in what it does not say. The question
of the material's "patent offensiveness"
never arises. Likewise the majority opinion never discusses the "social value"
issue which had been so prominent in
Memoirs. Justice Douglas, however, dissenting in Mishkin, asks why material of
"social value" to a non-conformist
minority is not tolerable, or is only the
social value of the majority important? 13

Not only does the majority avoid a close
examination of the fifty titles published by
Mishkin, but it shows greater deference
to the New York Court of Appeals'
findings of obscenity once it is sure that
that Court's understanding of Roth is
proper. "Since that definition (the New
York Court's) is more stringent than the
Roth definition, the judgment that the
constitutional criteria are satisfied is implicit in the application of §1141 below. 114

b. Protection of Minors
Another aspect of the "average person"
test concerns legislation directed against
material appealing only to children. Justice Brennan stirred renewed interest in
this problem with his decision in Jacobellis:
We recognize the legitimate and indeed
exigent interest of States and localities
Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509-10
(1966).
113 Ginzbirg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
482 (1966) (dissenting opinion). This opinion
applies also to Mishkin.
114 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508
(1966).
112

1'0 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 508-09
(1966).
"I Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 509
n.7 (1966).

Krafft-

13
throughout the Nation in preventing the
dissemination of material deemed harmful to children. . . . State and local
authorities might well consider whether
their objectives in this area would be
better served by laws aimed specifically
at preventing distribution of objectionable material to children, rather than at
totally prohibiting its dissemination."1 5
The Chief Justice made much the
same point, although in a different context, in his dissenting opinion in Jacobellis:
[T]he use to which various materials
are put-not just the words and pictures
themselves-must be considered in determining whether or not the materials
are obscene. A technical or legal treatise on pornography may well be inoffensive under most circumstances but, at
the same time, 'obscene' in the extreme
when sold or displayed to children." 6
What modifications would be required
in the constitutional standards for obscenity which is offered for sale or distribution to minors? One approach is to
rephrase the three-fold requirement along
these lines:

1)

the dominant theme of

the material taken as a whole must appeal
to the prurient interest of minors; 2)
the material is patently offensive because
it

affronts

contemporary

community

standards relating to the representation of
sexual matters to minors; 3) the material
is utterly without redeeming social importance to minors. The Mishkin decision
would justify the adjustment of the prurient interest test, but it did not discuss
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might be asked whether the material
must be patently offensive to minors
themselves or to adult views of what is
proper for minors. The debates about
national versus local community standards
and social importance seem less significant when minors are involved. Age,
however, is an important factor and might
be handled by a test based on the predominant appeal to a class of children
of the same general age group as the
child to whom the particular material
117
has been disseminated.
A second approach, adopted by New
York, skirts the definitional problem by
specifying in minute and graphic detail
the type of material which may not be
disseminated to children; the term "obscenity" is avoided completely." 8
A separate problem is the need for a
requirement that the distributor know the
age of the intended recipient of the material.
6. Commercial Exploitation
Whatever else Roth accomplished, it
focused attention on the material itself
as being the essential component of obscenity. Yet, hidden in Chief Justice Warren's concurring opinion in Roth was a
seminal idea which was to blossom almost a decade later in Ginzburg.
In Roth the Chief Justice had stated:
It is not the book that is on trial; it is
the person. The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity

the other two parts of the test. Thus it

".

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).

lioJacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 201 (1964)

(dissenting opinion).

117Dibble, Obscenity: A State Quarantine to
Protect Children, 39 S. CAL. L. REV. 345, 352
(1966).
118N.Y.
REV. PEN. LAW §235.21, formerly
N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 484-h, 484-i.
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of a book or picture. The nature of the
material is, of course, relevant as an attribute of the defendant's conduct, but
the materials are thus placed in context
from which they draw color and character. A wholly different result might be
reached in a different setting. . . . The
defendants in both these cases were engaged in the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised
to appeal to the erotic interest of their
customers. They were plainly engaged
in the commercial exploitations of the
morbid and shameful craving for materials with prurient effect." 9
The Model Penal Code had adopted a
similar approach in describing the criminal offense in terms of "pandering to an
interest

in

obscenity,"12

although

this

phrase was later rejected by members of
the

American

Law

Institute. 2 '

In

its

place were substituted provisions which
still possessed overtones of the commercialization rationale. Advertising or commercial appeals to sell material "whether
or not obscene, by representing or suggesting
lawed.

that it is obscene"
2

2

were

out-

Likewise, evidence of an "ap-

peal to prurient interest, or absence thereof, in advertising or other promotion of
2 3
the material" was admissible.

119 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96
(1957) (concurring opinion). The same point is
repeated in passing in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 201 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
120MODEL

PENAL

CODE

§207.10, Alternative

(1) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957).
121 Schwartz, Morals Oflenses
and the Model
Penal Code, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 680
(1963).
122 MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (2)
(e)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
123 MODEL PENAL CODE § 251.4 (4)
(e)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).

The Supreme Court paid no attention
to the commercialization theory until
Ginzburg v. United States, but then it
adopted it with vengeance. Ralph Ginzburg and three corporations controlled
by him had been convicted for violations
of the federal obscenity statute based on
the use of the mails. They had mailed
three publications: Eros, a hard-cover
quarterly magazine of expensive format;
Liaison, a bi-weekly newsletter on sexual
matters; and The Housewife's Handbook
on Selective Promiscuity; and circulars
advertising these publications.
Mr. Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, in which he was joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices Clark,
Fortas and White. He found Ginzburg
engaged in "the sordid business of pandering," which he defined in the words
of the Chief Justice's concurring opinion
in Roth as "the business of purveying
textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the erotic interest of
their customers.' 2 4 He found the "leer of
the sensualist" and abundant evidence for
his conclusion in the mailing addresses
Ginzburg had sought for these publications and in his advertising statements
and methods. Such evidence was relevant
in determining the ultimate question of
obscenity, and in this case it was decisive.
Applying the three-fold obscenity test of
Memoirs, Brennan argued that the deliberate representation of the publications as
erotic stimulated the reader to accept
them as prurient, heightened their offensiveness, and was relevant in determin-

124

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96

(1957).

13
ing whether the social importance claimed
for them was pretense or reality. Thus,
Justice Brennan saw "no threat to First
Amendment guarantees in . . . holding
that in close cases evidence of pandering
may be probative with respect to the
nature of the material in question and
thus satisfy the Roth test."'2 1 This analysis
was simply an "elaboration" of the test.
The Court was quick to add a caveat
to its conclusion:
No weight is ascribed to the fact that
petitioners have profited from the sale
of publications which we have assumed
but do not hold cannot themselves be
adjudged obscene in the abstract; to sanction consideration of this fact might indeed induce self-censorship, and offend
the frequently stated principle that
commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection
of expression secured by the First Am126
endment.
The majority opinion, despite the lipservice it pays to the Roth test, represented a major new element to be considered
in obscenity cases. What had been hinted
at in Memoirs became in Mishkin and
then dramatically in Ginzburg an emphasis on contextual obscenity instead of
27
definitional obscenity.1
Justice Harlan was disturbed by the
implications of this new supplement to
the obscenity test.'2 8 He criticized the ma-

125Ginzburg

v. United States, 383

U.S. 463,

474 (1966).
120

Ibid.
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jority for elaborating a theory of obscenity entirely unrelated to the language,
purpose, or history of the federal statute
applied in the case and different from
the test used by the trial court to correct the defendants. The Court had in
effect written a new "pandering" statute
without the sharply focused definitions
and standards necessary in the first
amendment area. Thus the Court had in
the last analysis sustained the convictions
"on the express assumption that the items
held to be obscene are not, viewing them
'129
strictly, obscene at all.
The Douglas dissent also shows difficulty with the majority's departure from
the concept of obscenity per se:
This new exception [to the first amendment] condemns an advertising technique as old as history. . . .The sexy advertisement neither adds to nor detracts
from the quality of the merchandise
being offered for sale. . . .A book should
stand on its own, irrespective of the reasons why it was written or the wiles
3°
used in selling it.
This comment is true to a point, but
it does not reach the Court's theory. This
seems to be that the advertising, rather
than affecting the material itself, assists a
court in reaching a judgment about the
material as obscene or not. It provides
the court with an insight into the distributor's own opinion of the material
and with indication as to whether the intended audience is likely to look upon the
material as obscene.

127 See Semonche, Definitional and Contextual

Obscenity: The Supreme Court's New and Disturbing Accommodation, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1173 (1966).
12S Ginzburg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463,
493 (1966) (dissenting opinion).

129Ginzburg

v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,

493-94 (1966)

(dissenting opinion).
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,

"3OGinzburg

482 (1966)

(dissenting opinion).
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The "close case" qualification of the
majority has also come in for its share of
criticism.'1'

According

to

the Brennan

opinion, it is argued, evidence of pandering is relevant only when a case is close.
But a case can be close only when the
usual Memoirs criteria are applied. This
was not done in Ginzburg, and in fact
the prosecution assumed that, standing
alone, the publications themselves might
not be obscene and the Court assumed
without deciding that the prosecution
2
could not have succeeded otherwise.'
"Therefore it was the evidence of pandering which made Ginzburg a close case,"
and
that meant that consideration of commercial exploitation had preceded rather
than followed the Court's determination
that Ginzburg was close, in violation of

the very rule the Court was announcing
as the holding of the case. In other
words, the Court first introduced evidence of pandering to give the impression
of a close case, and then it invoked the
finding of a close case to justify introduc13
ing the evidence of pandering.

3

The long-range implications of the
Ginzburg decision are not clear at this
time. The case may mark the beginning
of the end for the Roth-Memoirs test and
a concentration on the conduct of the
defendant. If this be so, then conceivably the Ginzburg decision may result
paradoxically in greater freedom of expression as long as the accompanying
advertising material does not emphasize

131 Note, More Ado About Dirty Books, 75

L.J. 1364, 1390 (1966).
132 Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463,
465-66 (1966).
YALE

"'3Supra note 131.

its prurient appeal. Even if both the
Roth-Memoirs test and the Ginzburg approach are applied with equal force, the
end result could be greater freedom, but
this will be dependent on a showing of
sufficient social value in the material to
remove it from the "close case" category.

III.

The 1967 Decisions

In an excellent review of the recent

obscenity decisions, Magrath thus summarized the five tests developed by the
Justices of the Supreme Court:
1. All material is constitutionally protected, except where it can be shown
to be so brigaded with illegal action
that it constitutes a clear and present
danger to significant social interests.
Justices Black and Douglas.
2. All material is constitutionally protected at both the federal and state
level except hard-core pornography.
Mr. Justice Stewart.
3. All material is constitutionally protected at the federal level except
hard-core pornography. Material may
be suppressed at the state level if
reasonable evidence supports a finding

that it is salacious and prurient. Mr.
Justice Harlan.

4. Material may be suppressed both by
the

federal. and

state

governments

when prurient appeal, patent offensiveness, and an utter lack of social value
coalesce; in addition, in close cases

evidence that the producer or distributor commercially exploited the
material so as to emphasize its pruriency withdraws constitutional protection from otherwise protected material. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas.
5. Material may be suppressed if its
dominant appeal taken as a whole is

13
to prurient interest.
4
and White."

Justices

Clark

Dr. Magrath described the law of ob-
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without redeeming social value.' Another
Justice [White] has not viewed the 'social value' element as an independent
1 37
factor in the judgment of obscenity.

scenity as a "constitutional disaster area,"

but apparently the Supreme Court was
not offended by his description when
Redrup,"35 together with two other state
cases, was decided in May 1967. Not
only did the Court cite the Magrath article, 136 but it drew up its own version

of the various obscenity tests, deciding
that the materials in question were not

obscene by any of them:
Two members [Justices Black and Douglas] of the Court have consistently adhered to the view that a State is utterly without power to suppress, control,
or punish the distribution of any writings
or pictures upon the ground of their 'obscenity.' A third [Justice Stewart] has
held to the opinion that a state's power
in this area is narrowly limited to a
distinct and clearly identifiable class of
material. Others [Chief Justice Warren,
Justices Brennan and Fortas] have subscribed to a not dissimilar standard,
holding that a state may not constitutionally inhibit the distribution of literary material as obscene unless '(a) the
dominant theme of the material taken
as a whole appeals to a prurient interest
in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards r~lating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is'utterly without redeeming social value,' emphasizing
that the 'three elements must coalesce,'
and that no such material can 'be prescribed unless it is found to be utterly

Magrath, The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of
Roth, THE SUP. CT. REV. 7, 56-57 (P. Kurland
ed. 1966).
135 Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
1361d. at 770 n.8.

The technique employed by the Court
in Redrup is interesting. It suggests that
the Court has decided to pause for breath
after the fourteen opinions needed to decide Memoirs, Mishkin and Ginzburg.
Instead of attempting to define obscenity
further or to refute one another's positions, the Justices appear to be seeking
a consensus, even if it be nothing more
than a statement that particular material
is not obscene by any of the established
standards.
Equally interesting was the Court's
enumeration of the claims and evidence
which were not present in Redrup:
In none of the cases was there a claim
that the statute reflected a specific and
limited state concern for juveniles. See
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158;
cf. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380.
In none was there any suggestion of an
assault upon individual privacy by publication in a manner so obtrusive as to
make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to it. Cf.
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622;
Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343
U.S. 451. And in none was there evidence of the sort of 'pandering' which
the Court found significant in Ginzburg
v. United States, 383 U.S. 463.138
The raising of these three issues may
be significant. The question of special
legislation for children had been mentioned only once before in the decisions
since Roth. In Jacobellis, Justice Brennan

134

7

at 770-71.
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and the Chief Justice had pointed out the
possibility that legislation aimed at protecting children would run into fewer
constitutional difficulties. 139 The concept
of "assault on privacy" is a new one for
an obscenity decision. It is probably related to the "patent offensiveness" requirement, but the assault concept shifts
the emphasis from the material to the
purveyor's conduct. This is the same
emphasis which the Chief Justice had
proposed in Roth and finally persuaded
the Court to adopt in Ginzburg. Finally,
the reference to Ginzburg suggests that
the "pandering" doctrine has lost none
of its vitality.
The Court thus seems to have listed
three types of social interest which it
considers to be legitimate objects of state
concern: children, privacy and commercial exploitation of sex. Perhaps the
Court is now beginning to indicate the
rationale for obscenity legislation. Instead
of justifying such legislation as a protector of public morality, it is finding specific
"secular" goals and interest which help
make up public morality but do not have
undesirable religious overtones about
them. One might ask now whether in the
future the Court will find material obscene only when it fits into one of these
categories or offends one of these three
social interests.
A final point of interest about Redrup
is its comparison of the hard-core pornography standard of Justice Stewart with
the Roth-Memoirs test, the latter being
"riot dissimilar" from the former. 140 The
139 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195
(1964).
140 Redrup
v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770

(1967).

Court cites the Magrath article in connection with its description of the Stewart
position. Magrath argues, as a possible
resolution of the impasse in which the
Supreme Court presently finds itself, that
"there exists a definable, reasonably precise, concept of hard-core pornography
which, at least theoretically, could unite
a strong majority of the Court." 141 The
materials for such a constitutional compromise are present in the agreement of
all the Justices except Black and Douglas
that something called obscenity is not
entitled to first amendment protection and
that it includes at least hard-core pornography. All seem to agree that there
should be high standards of procedural
fairness in obscenity cases and that children are entitled to special protection.
Magrath calls on the Court to redefine
obscenity as hard-core pornography in
some forthcoming decision. The "not
dissimilar" language of Redrup and, indeed, the entire opinion, suggest the early
stages of the proposed constitutional
compromise.
The new restraint of the Court showed
itself one month after Redrup when the
Court reversed per curiam thirteen federal and state court judgments finding
material obscene.1 4 2 Without waiting for

141

Magrath, The Obscenity Cases:

Roth, THE SUP. CT. REV. 7, 69
ed. 1966).
142 Keney v. New York, 388 U.S.
Friedman v. New York, 388 U.S.
Ratner v. California, 388 U.S.
Cobert v. New York, 388 U.S.
Sheperd v. New York, 388 U.S.
Avansino v. New York, 388 U.S.
Aday v. United States, 388 U.S.

Grapes of

(P. Kurland
440
441
442
443
444
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(1967);
(1967);
(1967);
(1967);
(1967);
(1967);
(1967);

Corinth Publications, Inc. v. Wesberry, 388
U.S. 448 (1967); Books, Inc. v. United States,
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full briefs and arguments, it simply granted certiorari and reversed, citing Redrup
in eleven cases, Sunshine Book Company
v. Summerfield in a twelfth, and nothing
in the thirteenth. Justices Black, Douglas,
Stewart, Fortas and White constituted the
majority in all thirteen cases. Justice
Brennan joined them in nine of the cases,
while the Chief Justice and Justice Clark
also agreed in three of these nine. In all
of the state cases Justice Harlan would
affirm on the bases of his Roth and
Memoirs or Manual Enterprises opinions.
The apparent rationale for the majority's action is the same as that in Redrup,
that is, that special legislation protecting
children, assault on privacy and pandering were not involved, and that the materials were not obscene under any of the
tests currently used by the various
Justices.
The significance of the use of the per
curiam decision is difficult to assess.
Once before, in 1957, the Court had
reversed per curiam four lower court de1 43
cisions, citing only Roth or Alberts.

388 U.S. 449 (1967); Rosenbloom v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 450 (1967); A Quantity of Copies of
Books v. Kansas, 388 U.S. 452 (1967); Mazes
v. Ohio, 388 U.S. 453 (1967); Schackman v.
California, 388 U.S. 454 (1967).
143Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 355
U.S. 35 (1958); Sunshine Book Co. v. Sum-

The Court apparently made an independent examination of the materials and
found that censorship of the materials
violated constitutional requirements. 4 4 It
is likely that the Court followed the same
procedure in the thirteen 1967 cases and
felt no need for further enlightenment
from counsel about the law or the obscenity vel non of the materials in question. It hardly seems likely that the technique represents a victory for Justice
Black's position that the Court should not
become involved in the review of materials found obscene.
The appearance in two of the cases of
Thurgood Marshall's name, then Solicitor
General and now Supreme Court Justice,
raises speculation about the course of
future obscenity decisions, particularly
since one vote is so crucial in this area.
Justice Clark, formerly Attorney General,
represented a strong conservative force.
It will be interesting to see how the background elements of civil rights champion
and Solicitor General influence Justice
Marshall's position on obscenity.

merfield, 355 U.S. 372 (1958); One, Inc. v.
Olesen, 355 U.S. 371 (1958); Mounce v.

United States, 355 U.S. 180 (1957).
44 See Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of
Obscenity: The Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 34 (1960).

